Sohagni Roy
Quite often, as I stand at the edge of Jantar Mantar and watch a police officer tighten the barricades across the road, I see space. It surprises me, for, like democracy or citizenship or the human right to protest, space is not supposed to be seen. It is not that standing in New Delhi, this capital of monumental avenues, government buildings and carefully cultivated national spectacles, has given me some special ability to see what I had not been able to see before. It is just that, when the police begin deciding where people can stand, how far they can walk and how long they can remain together, space suddenly acquires a very visible grammar. Everything competes with it for visibility: placards, police uniforms, detention vans, commuters searching for an alternative route, journalists trying to document an unfolding confrontation and, of course, the institutions that seem much easier to approach in a textbook than on the street. Light, which can illuminate a public institution, cannot necessarily illuminate the distance between that institution and the people who wish to question it. On 10 October 2026, as protesters gathered in Delhi demanding the resignation of Chief Election Commissioner Gyanesh Kumar over the disputed Special Intensive Revision of electoral rolls, this distance acquired a material form. Barricades obstructed routes, police detained protesters, and restrictions on transport and mobile internet affected the city’s circulation. The Election Commission maintained that electoral revision was intended to improve the accuracy of voter lists; critics questioned its implementation and warned of possible disenfranchisement. The disagreement was therefore not simply about a list of names. It concerned the conditions under which people could make claims about their own political existence-and whether the institutions responsible for administering citizenship could be held publicly accountable for the ways in which they did so.
This disorientation is followed by anger and confusion, of the body as much as the mind, which coagulate into a mixture of disbelief and reluctant familiarity. We have become accustomed to seeing democracy represented through the visual grammar of elections: the inked finger, the queue outside a polling booth, the electronic voting machine, the triumphant party headquarters. The ballot is photographed; the voter is counted; the result is announced. But what happens when citizens attempt to question the procedures through which the electorate itself is constituted? Who gets to count the people who count? The question sounds like a riddle, but its consequences are administrative, material and profoundly political. When a revision of electoral rolls is contested, the dispute concerns not only the accuracy of a database but also the relationship between documentary legibility and the right to participate. A person may exist socially, work, pay rent, raise children and belong to a neighbourhood, yet still find that their political existence depends upon whether their name appears in the appropriate column. James C. Scott’s Seeing Like a State (1998) helps explain how governments make complex populations administratively legible through standardised records, categories and measurements. Such legibility is indispensable to many public functions, including the maintenance of electoral rolls. But a list is never the population itself; it is a representation of the population, constructed through rules that can be examined, challenged and corrected. The democratic question is not whether electoral lists should be accurate. Of course they should. It is whether the procedures used to make them accurate are themselves sufficiently transparent, accessible and accountable to those whose political standing depends on them.
How is one to draw space in place of the barricade? Henri Lefebvre’s The Production of Space (1974) offers a useful starting point, because it refuses to treat space as an innocent container into which social life simply pours. Space is produced through power, labour, planning and everyday practice. A road is not merely a road: it is a worker’s route to a shift, a vendor’s access to customers, a commuter’s connection between home and employment, and, under particular circumstances, a place where citizens assemble to make a claim upon the state. The barricade brings these otherwise overlapping uses into conflict. It announces that the road is public, but that its publicness can be suspended, redirected, or selectively distributed. The irony is difficult to miss: the state may designate a place for protest and then restrict access to it in the name of maintaining order around it. A designated protest site can become a curious political arrangement-a place where citizens are permitted to be visible, provided their visibility does not travel too far. The distinction is between allowing a crowd to occupy a location and allowing its claims to enter the wider public sphere. Lefebvre’s right to the city is useful here because it asks not simply who may enter an urban space, but who has the power to shape its uses and participate in the political life it makes possible. A barricade is, in this sense, an argument made out of metal. It tells the citizen where the city would prefer the claim to stop.
There are other words, too. When a road is closed, we hear of a traffic advisory; when a gathering is restricted, we hear of a security arrangement; when hundreds of people are taken away, we hear of preventive detention and the maintenance of law and order. Each phrase may have a legitimate administrative meaning, but together they can produce an extraordinary linguistic effect: the more disruptive an event becomes for the people experiencing it, the more ordinary it can sound in the language used to manage it. The closure of a metro station becomes a service restriction; the interruption of mobile internet becomes a preventive measure; a person’s removal from a public gathering becomes a completed procedure. In its reporting on 10 October, The Indian Express described a large police deployment, barricaded routes, and the detention of hundreds of protesters; Newslaundry reported that its journalists and an intern were also detained while covering the demonstrations. These details matter because they show that the restriction of public space does not affect only the people who have chosen to protest. It can also affect the circulation of information through which others learn what is happening.
Michel Foucault’s lectures on Security, Territory, Population (1977–78) help us see why this matters. Modern power does not operate only by forbidding actions or punishing violations. It also organises circulation: the movement of bodies, goods, information and risks through a territory. A city can be governed by keeping its roads open, but it can also be governed by deciding which roads will remain open to whom. It can manage a demonstration without banning every slogan, simply by controlling the routes through which protesters reach one another, the places where they can assemble and the duration for which they can remain. The police barricade is therefore not merely an obstacle to movement; it is an instrument for sorting movement. Some people pass through; some are diverted; some are stopped; others are carried away. The distinction is not necessarily evidence that every restriction is illegitimate. Public safety is a real responsibility, and demonstrations take place among other people whose journeys, work and ordinary lives matter too. But the language of security cannot settle the question by itself. We must still ask what threat was identified, what evidence supported the response, whether the restriction was proportionate and whether less restrictive alternatives were available. Otherwise, public order risks becoming a phrase that explains everything and therefore allows us to examine very little.
There are costs, too, that do not appear on the police inventory. A detention van carries bodies away from a site, but the consequences of that removal travel in several directions at once. There may be lost wages, missed classes, interrupted journeys, legal expenses, worried families, and employers who are less interested in the constitutional significance of a protest than in why an employee did not arrive on time. For a salaried professional, an unexpected delay may be an inconvenience; for a daily-wage worker, the same delay may mean a day’s income lost. Someone with private transport can absorb a diversion more easily than someone dependent on a particular bus or metro connection. These are not claims that every person detained on 10 October experienced every one of these consequences. They are the unequal possibilities that an account of detention must investigate rather than assume away. I would call this a detention economy: the visible machinery of detention and the less visible distribution of its costs. It includes not only the people taken into custody but also those who begin calculating whether they can afford to attend the next gathering. The most consequential detention may sometimes be the one that never has to occur because its possibility has already altered someone’s decision.
Judith Butler’s Notes Toward a Performative Theory of Assembly (2015) helps explain why the material conditions of assembly belong to the substance of democracy rather than to its logistical background. A gathering is not simply a collection of individuals delivering separate statements. Bodies assembled in public make a claim through their very presence: we are here, we are affected, and we demand to be recognised as participants in the world that governs us. But bodies cannot assemble by force of political conviction alone. They need time, transport, physical safety and the ability to remain together. A formally recognised right can therefore become practically unequal when the material conditions necessary to exercise it are distributed unevenly. The question is not whether every protest must be allowed to occupy every road indefinitely. It is whether restrictions preserve a meaningful opportunity for collective speech or reduce that speech to a performance staged at a distance from the people and institutions it seeks to address. Democracy cannot be measured only by whether a protest was technically permitted. We must also examine whether people could reach it, remain there, communicate their demands and leave without facing disproportionate consequences.
On television and social media, meanwhile, the barricade has a second life. It becomes an image: the line of helmets, the raised placard, the body being carried towards a bus, the crowd pressing against a metal barrier. Such images can document abuses and bring a local confrontation to audiences far beyond the street. But spectacle has its own appetite. The confrontation can become more compelling than the question that produced it; the image of a detained protester can travel further than the evidence needed to assess the underlying electoral dispute. Guy Debord’s The Society of the Spectacle (1967) offers a way of thinking about this substitution, in which social and political relations increasingly reach us through images that can appear to stand in for the relations themselves. The protest becomes a spectacle of disorder, the police deployment a spectacle of control, and the viewer is invited to choose between them before fully understanding what is at stake. The danger is not simply that the media may misrepresent an event. It is that visibility itself may be mistaken for accountability. A grievance can become spectacularly visible without receiving a substantive answer; a city can be saturated with images of protest while the political conditions that produced it remain difficult to examine.
The barricade, then, does not merely divide the street into two sides. It reveals that public space is never simply there, waiting for citizens to use it. It is continually produced, regulated and contested through the ordinary objects and procedures that organise everyday life. The challenge is to look beyond the spectacle of metal and uniforms towards the unequal arrangements that make some citizens more mobile, more visible and less vulnerable than others. It is also to resist the comforting fiction that removing a barricade automatically restores the freedom it interrupted. Roads may reopen; metro services may resume; a detention van may drive away. Yet a citizen whose wages have been lost, whose family has spent hours searching for information, or whose fear of detention has made future participation seem too costly does not necessarily return to the same political position. Nor does the restoration of traffic resolve questions about electoral transparency or institutional accountability. The city may resume its ordinary rhythm, but ordinary life is precisely where the consequences of political restrictions are often absorbed and forgotten. No, no, democracy is not simply the right to assemble. It is the right to make a claim without having to bear an arbitrarily unequal price for making it-and the right to expect that the institutions being questioned will answer the claim rather than merely manage the people who raise it.
“The protesters are demanding the resignation of Chief Election Commissioner Gyanesh Kumar over alleged irregularities in the Special Intensive Revision of electoral rolls.” This was the news from New Delhi on September 25, when citizens gathered at Jantar Mantar to protest against the revision of electoral rolls and demand accountability from the Election Commission. A group of students, political activists and civil society members had assembled with placards calling for the suspension of SIR. The unexpected convergence of electoral revision, police action and the demand for institutional accountability set me thinking. Citizens had come together to challenge an institution entrusted with protecting the integrity of elections. Their destination was Jantar Mantar, the designated site of protest in the national capital. Three days earlier, on September 22, the Supreme Court had delivered its judgment on the Bihar electoral-roll revision, directing the Election Commission to publish the names of excluded voters and accept specified identity documents, including Aadhaar, for claims and objections. The controversy surrounding electoral revision had already moved beyond administrative procedure into the question of democratic inclusion. On September 25, protesters at Jantar Mantar faced heavy police deployment, restrictions on movement and detention. The site of the confrontation was not too far from Parliament, where representatives of the people deliberate on the laws that govern them. The time of the year, too, was significant: the approaching Gandhi Jayanti, associated with the memory of non-violent resistance and civil disobedience. From the moment the protesters arrayed themselves for the confrontation, the media gaze, the divya-chakshu, turned to the spot where the action was taking place.
In the Mahabharata, Sanjaya, gifted with divine vision, was charged with the task of presenting a blow-by-blow account of the war to the blind father of the Kauravas. The initial day on the ancient Kurukshetra battlefield was spent in shouting war slogans and blowing insignia-conches. In the contemporary confrontation, too, slogans, placards and police barricades became the insignia of a struggle over political authority. On September 25, protesters demanding accountability from the Election Commission were detained. On October 2, Gandhi Jayanti, the action moved to a larger confrontation near Jantar Mantar, where hundreds of police personnel were deployed and demonstrators were prevented from reaching the designated protest site. On October 3, the Delhi Police registered three FIRs in connection with the demonstrations, invoking Section 223 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, which concerns disobedience of an order duly promulgated by a public servant. On October 10, the mobilisation intensified, with police detaining more than 2,000 protesters, according to Reuters, as authorities restricted movement across parts of central Delhi. On October 16, the arrest of Cockroach Janta Party founder Abhijeet Dipke ahead of another planned demonstration brought the confrontation into a new phase. Besides, there is in the background the constitutional authority of the Election Commission, the power of the executive to regulate public assembly and the expanding use of preventive detention to pre-empt political mobilisation. The barricades around Jantar Mantar and the police buses waiting to carry away demonstrators are reminiscent of the elaborate arrangements through which a kingdom attempts to contain a challenge to its authority. There is also the question of the electoral roll itself, a register through which the abstract promise of citizenship acquires its practical meaning. Although apparently superficial, the similarities are eye-catching. The ancient epic depicts a war over rightful inheritance, sovereignty and the obligations of those entrusted with power. The contemporary confrontation concerns the right of citizens to participate in the political life of the republic. The Constitution marks the foundation of that claim. The question is whether the institutions established to protect democracy can remain accountable to the people in whose name they exercise authority.
Indeed, the confrontation between the protesters and the government has an epic scale.
The Mahabharata was set in times that witnessed profound transformations in social organisation, political authority and the obligations of kinship. The current confrontation is set in times when society is witnessing a shift from the promise of a responsible democratic State towards the concentration of political power and the increasing use of administrative and police machinery to contain dissent. All that the Pandavas were asking for was their right over Hastinapur. All that the protesters at Jantar Mantar are asking for is accountability from the institution that oversees elections and protection of their right to participate in the democratic process. They argue that if electoral rolls determine who can exercise the franchise, their revision must not become a mechanism through which eligible citizens are rendered vulnerable to administrative exclusion. Those of our countrymen who are not directly connected with electoral administration tend to think that if the Election Commission has the authority to revise voter lists, why should citizens object to the exercise? Every day, so many political commentators have been asking similar questions in television debates. The logic in this question is straightforward, but the understanding of the issue can be deeply flawed. Electoral administration is not merely a technical exercise; it is a fundamental component of democratic citizenship. The register through which citizens exercise their political rights cannot be treated as an ordinary administrative document whose accuracy matters more than the people whose names it contains. Indian democracy did not create its citizens; citizens, through a long history of political struggle, created the democratic republic. Voting is not merely an occasion to select a government but the very basis of representative government. Hence, when eligible voters face the possibility of exclusion, and when those demanding explanations are detained, legislators and constitutional authorities should not look at them merely as an economic or law-and-order liability.
True to the characteristic habit of political propaganda, the ruling establishment and its supporters have portrayed the agitation as an attempt by opposition parties to undermine the legitimacy of the electoral process. The genuine concerns raised by protesters have consequently become entangled in partisan accusations. The Election Commission maintains that SIR is intended to ensure the accuracy of electoral rolls and has rejected allegations of partisan manipulation. Opposition parties and civil society groups have questioned the process, raising concerns about deletions, documentation requirements and the possibility of eligible voters being excluded. These competing claims must be examined through evidence, transparent procedures and effective remedies rather than settled through political denunciation. Many government supporters question why citizens should object to a process intended to correct electoral inaccuracies. But the question is not whether electoral rolls should be accurate; it is whether the process of making them accurate can itself produce exclusion without adequate safeguards. It is not the government that grants citizens their constitutional rights but the Constitution that limits the power of the government. Citizens do not owe the State unquestioning obedience in exchange for the opportunity to vote. They are asking for a guarantee that their political participation will not be compromised by administrative errors, arbitrary exclusion, or the absence of effective remedies. When their demands are met with barricades, detention and criminal cases, the State risks transforming a question of electoral accountability into a question of public order.
There have been many debates within the Mahabharata about why the war that destroyed so many lives could not have been prevented in the first place. Many of those discussions point to the greed, contempt, and anger of Duryodhana and to his father’s turning, literally, a blind eye to injustice. The ancient Mahabharata provided an occasion for a metaphysical text like the Gita. Anger towards those who hold divergent views and contempt for constitutional norms are dangerous features of any political order. The Constitution assures us that India is and will continue to be a democracy. Article 324 entrusts the superintendence, direction and control of elections to the Election Commission, while Article 19 guarantees the freedom of speech and the right to assemble peaceably and without arms, subject to constitutionally permitted restrictions. These provisions are not contradictory. They are essential to the same democratic arrangement. The authority to administer elections must be accompanied by the obligation to preserve public confidence in them; the authority to maintain public order must be accompanied by the obligation to respect peaceful dissent.
The detention of protesters brings us to another question: the emergence of what may be described as a detention economy. The term does not refer to a formally recognised economic sector but to a political arrangement in which the containment of dissent becomes a routine instrument of governance. Barricades, preventive detention, restrictions on public assembly, police transport, prohibitory orders and criminal proceedings may each be defended by the authorities in the language of security and public order. Yet, when deployed repeatedly against citizens attempting to question the exercise of public power, these measures can impose a cost on democratic participation itself. The cost is borne not merely by those who are detained but also by those who are discouraged from attending a demonstration, those who cannot reach a designated protest site and those who conclude that exercising a constitutional right may entail an unacceptable personal or professional risk. The detention economy operates not only through confinement but also through the anticipation of confinement. Its most consequential effect may be the production of silence before the police need to enforce it.
Let us hope that the agitation against SIR and the demands for the resignation of the Chief Election Commissioner provide the regime and the Election Commission with an occasion to think about constitutional norms. A democracy cannot be defended merely by counting votes; it must also protect the conditions under which citizens can register, cast their votes, question institutions and assemble in public. Jantar Mantar should remain a place where the people can make their claims upon authority, not a place from which their political presence is routinely removed. The measure of a democracy is not how efficiently it can detain its dissenters but how willingly it can answer their questions. Bharat need not go through a Mahabharata-like destruction for defending democracy.
Can one extend the Mahabharata analogy to suggest that a subaltern, as opposed to a middle-class, suspiciously bhadralok, Sanjaya would have narrated the farmers’ protest and the SIR agitation differently, liberated from, and dismissive of, the burden of institutional deference? This ‘Other’ Sanjaya may have even cultivated a more socially diverse assembly of witnesses, attentive not merely to the spectacle of barricades and political confrontation but to those whose names risk disappearing from electoral rolls and whose bodies bear the costs of making dissent visible. But would the bhadralok admirers of democracy, self-appointed gatekeepers of electoral propriety, approve of a narrator who questions not only who gets counted, but who gets to count, see, and tell the nation’s story?
Reference
Butler, Judith. Notes Toward a Performative Theory of Assembly. Harvard University Press, 2015.
Debord, Guy. The Society of the Spectacle. Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith, Zone Books, 1994.
Foucault, Michel. Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1977–1978. Edited by Michel Senellart, translated by Graham Burchell, Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.
India. The Constitution of India. Legislative Department, Ministry of Law and Justice, Government of India, legislative.gov.in/constitution-of-india.
Lefebvre, Henri. The Production of Space. Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith, Blackwell, 1991.
Mehrotra, Khushi, and Akankhya Rout. “Journalists Detained, Microphone Snatched as Delhi Police Remove Protesters from Jantar Mantar.” Newslaundry, 25 Sept. 2026, www.newslaundry.com/2026/09/25/journalists-detained-microphone-snatched-as-delhi-police-remove-protesters-from-jantar-mantar.
Reuters. “Delhi Sealed off Ahead of Youth Protest against Indian Election Chief.” Reuters, 10 Oct. 2026, www.reuters.com/world/india/delhi-sealed-off-ahead-youth-protest-against-indian-election-chief-2026-10-10.
Scott, James C. Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed. Yale University Press, 1998.
Singh, Alok, et al. “Jantar Mantar Barred, Protesters Spread out, Demonstrations Pop up at Multiple Sites.” The Indian Express, 10 Oct. 2026, indianexpress.com/article/cities/delhi/cjp-protest-flash-demonstrations-dilli-haat-raj-ghat-10915952.
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Sohagni Roy enjoys working at the intersection of heritage, storytelling, and public history, tracing how regional cultures are archived, remembered, and made visible across borders.
