Zahid Kamal
Abstract: This article analyses the trajectory of Muslim political engagement in India after the Pahalgam terror attack in April 2025. The argument flows as the traditional paradigm of Muslim politics—predominantly reactionary and identity-centred—is set to enter a new phase marked by selective alignment with the ruling majoritarian regime. To validate the argument, the article analyses the political posturing of Asaduddin Owaisi, President of AIMIM, whose rhetoric post-Pahalgam signalled a calculated assertion of Indian nationalism while maintaining a commitment to Muslim identity concerns. Comparing the historical and contemporary cases—such as the Shah Bano case, Babri Masjid dispute, and Triple Talaq Bill—the article concludes an observable evolution of Muslim political change—from sentimental communal engagement to issue-based strategic cooperation and alignment. It enlists Owaisi’s assertive nationalism, anti-Pakistan rhetoric and proactive participation in a state-sponsored diplomatic envoy to Gulf countries.
Introduction: The trajectory of Muslim political engagement in India has recently entered a new phase, marked by recalibration and cooperation with the BJP government headed by Narendra Modi. This shift is sharply reflected in the aftermath of the Pahalgham terror attack to reflect a fundamental dilemma with Muslim politics: to express a sense of nationalism—which is widely expected from the Muslim community—while simultaneously asserting a distinct Muslim identity that has long been the central arena of Muslim political engagement. The most noticeable political figure in this development emerges as Asaduddin Owaisi, President of the All India Majlis-e-Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen (AIMIM), who is viewed by some as a reflection of contemporary Muslim political psyche. While his career is remembered for his vocal opposition to the right-wing ideological framework that is pushed by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and its affiliated organisations, his recent rhetoric on nationalism and Pakistan—particularly his participation in the national delegation sent abroad to convey India’s narrative concerning Operation Sindoor—elicited divergent interpretations. Some interpret it as intended alignment and co-option with the BJP, while others view it as a genuine expression of one’s nationalism and faith in the Indian State. Such an interpretation is a result of a broader tension within the Indian Muslim psyche that wanders in the middle of the way, attracted by both religious sentiment and constraints of nationalism.
This article navigates the trajectory of Muslim political engagement post-Pahalgam, moving from confrontation to selective cooperation and alignment with the so-called anti-Muslim BJP government. It seeks validation from the agitations and condemnation demonstrated by the community in general, and particularly in Owaisi’s rhetoric. Although this shift remains contentious within the community, its broader impact warrants evaluation.
Community-Centred Sentimental Politics: The political leadership of the Muslim community since 1947 has faced recurrent crises. Immediately after independence, they experienced an identity crisis due to the heavy blame attributed to them for making the partition possible (Husain, 1965). Soon, they experienced the heat of the Babri issue that began in 1949, reaching its peak in the 80s and 90s and ultimately coming to an end in 2019 with the Supreme Court decision. The AMU minority issue witnessed a heated political round at the national level, consuming a large portion of the community’s energy in the 60s and 70s and ultimately passing the AMU (Amendment) Act of 1981. Even after the passage of the bill, the minority status of AMU was never operationalised until 2005, and it is still in a dormant status due to a stay order from the judiciary. It raises the question whether the two-decade-long struggle for minority status was just a rhetorical exercise or if it genuinely meant something substantive.
The Shah Bano case of 1985 for a maintenance amount of 179 rupees for a 73-year-old woman (Hasan, 1988) shook the governmental machinery and compelled the Rajiv Gandhi government to turn down the Supreme Court’s decision. The Muslim clergy and prominent Muslim leaders turned so reactive to the matter that they tossed it the most polarising issue of that decade, ultimately convincing the majority community of a wild misinterpretation—the Indian State and particularly the Congress being run by Sharia law. Thus, providing an easy way for the right-wing forces to step up to the power easily and smoothly.
The triple talaq issue, which was tabled in the so-called Hindu-majoritarian regime of Modi 1.0, was passed by Modi 2.0 in 2019. The issue, though debatable within the Muslim community—Ahle-Hadith and many other scholars counting instant triple talaq as one—saw conservative textual interpreters urging the government to consider their interpretation as the true text of the Quran. The conservative scholars, though they view triple talaq as un-Islamic, uncivilised, inhuman, and a punishable offence, wanted the altered interpretation—once done by Umar according to the context of that society—to remain unchanged forever. The mass campaigning, letter-writing initiatives, and mass protests proved to be merely formalities. To our surprise, many of them are now admitting that the criminalisation of triple talaq was a positive step for the dignity of women, for the smooth flow of the family system, and for society at large.
The community-centred sentimental issues that have engulfed Muslim politics range from cultural concerns such as the status of Urdu and the AMU’s minority status; land-related issues like the Babri Masjid dispute and Waqf Board amendments; family laws including triple talaq maintenance rights and UCC; and security issues such as mob lynching, cow vigilantism, anti-Muslim riots, and communalism. Muslim political engagement on most of these issues has been marked with reactionary and confrontational postures. The Muslim leadership has often been criticised for prioritising so-called religious issues over more pressing concerns such as employment, economic opportunities, education, and security—issues that disproportionately affect the lower classes within the community, particularly Pasmanda Muslims, OBCs, and Dalit Muslims.
The Congress Party has, over time, been criticised for compromising its secular stance—a critique sharply reflected in its handling of the Shah Bano case in favour of conservative Muslims (Hasan, 1988; Jaffrelot, 2009) and in the Babri Masjid case in favour of Hindu interests. The accusation of pseudo-secularism and prioritising Sharia law over constitutional values hit the Congress—once called the Congress system by Rajni Kothari—so hard that it could not reclaim its former political prestige till the time. The right-wing dominance after 2014 left the Muslim vote bank irrelevant to a considerable extent, and the Muslim community as a whole found itself in the lowest defensive front so far since independence.
The Pahalgam Attack and Aftermath: With such a historical background, any transformative shift in the trajectory of Muslim politics amounts to a great fortune to be grabbed. One such opportunity landed with developing situations after the terrorist attack in Pahalgam on April 22nd, 2025. The terrorists operated with a clear vision to destabilise the unity and integrity of India by obstructing the normalisation process in Jammu and Kashmir after the abrogation of Article 370. Data indicate that tourist visits in the region had picked up steady momentum in the recent past to boost the state’s economy and restore public faith in the Indian State. The heinous act of identifying one’s religion, asking to recite the Kalima, and assassinating for failing to recite the same was not only an assault on the Indian state but also a grave threat to the security of over 200 million Muslims residing across the country.
The Pahalgam attack served as a unifying moment for divergent political forces—be they Congress, left-wing, right-wing or Muslim. From among the Muslims, the 3 faces that emerged as focal points were Colonel Sophia Qureshi to address the nation regarding Operation Sindoor, Mohammad Zuber from Alt News to counter the Pakistani media’s fake news and propaganda war, and, of course, Asaduddin Owaisi to represent the strongest voice against Pakistan.
Owaisi’s Position Post-Pahalgam: Asaduddin Owaisi has significantly reshaped Muslim political attitude following the Pahalgam terror attack. Owaisi’s swift and unequivocal response to the Pahalgam attack—positioning himself as a staunch nationalist who prioritises India’s unity and security—elevated his national image and redefined his role in Indian Muslim politics. His severe condemnation of Pakistan as a “failed state, terror state, official beggar state, unreliable and illogical state” was recorded by national and international media. By framing the attack as an assault on India’s unity and integrity, Owaisi established an alternative narrative, diverting it to turn into a Hindu-Muslim issue that otherwise could have intensified already hyperactive communal tensions. His rhetoric, such as calling Pakistan-backed terrorists “worse than Khawarij” and “ISIS successors, Lashkar-e-Shaitan and Jaish-e-Shaitan” (Bose, 2025, May 18) (Das, 2025), attracted a broad audience, including a huge number of his harsh critics, earning him unexpected support and sympathy on social media.
This stance allowed Owaisi to win multiple goals at one go: he distanced Indian Muslims from Pakistan’s actions, refuted the “Go to Pakistan” taunt often directed at Muslims, foiled any attempt to project the terror attack as a Hindu-Muslim issue, and reinforced his community’s loyalty to the nation. With all these, he strengthened his position as a defender of Muslim identity within a nationalist framework.
Owaisi’s inclusion in an all-party delegation to Gulf countries to expose Pakistan’s role in nurturing terrorism marks a significant shift in his political trajectory. It reflects his flexibility to align with the government on national security while maintaining a distinct Muslim identity in domestic issues. In Bahrain, he urged the global community to support India’s call to place Pakistan on the FATF grey list, highlighting the human cost of terrorism.
With these developments recurring one after the other, the anti-Muslim propaganda war was seen—for the first time post-2014—softening in tone and shrinking in scale. Even the toxic anti-Muslim social media handles were seen empathising with Asaduddin Owaisi’s stances on the developing politics post the terror attack. This empathy was not meaningful just for Owaisi; rather, it was a soothing breeze for the common Muslim dispersed over the country, who, after a long period, felt a renewed sense of security and pride in the country.
Challenges and Critique: The unanticipated pro-government stance of Owaisi didn’t go unchallenged. A severe criticism from the community bombarded on social media questioning his position on mob lynching, bulldozing of homes, and punitive stance of the judiciary —where process turns into punishment —is still going on in different parts of the country.
The discussed change in the Muslim political engagement after Pahalgam was something unexpected and surprising. Since the Gujarat Hindu-Muslim Riots in 2002, the dominant Muslim imagination has been against Narendra Modi. With such an imagination, it was wild to think of Muslim politics cooperating and collaborating with the BJP government headed by Narendra Modi. The Muslim political mobilisation post-2014 period has been marked by anti-Modism—a reactionary, impulsive engagement lacking any positive imagination of Indian politics and the Indian state.
Conclusion: The above discussion illuminates that the trajectory of Muslim political engagement post-Pahalgam terrorist attack reflects a subtle yet consequential transition from reactionary politics to a selective strategic alignment on issues such as national security and integrity, without abandoning the core markers of one’s distinct Muslim identity. Owaisi’s recalibrated rhetoric—marked by an unequivocal endorsement of Indian nationalism and upfront condemnation of Pakistan—demonstrates a critical moment of redefinition of Muslim politics. This is not merely a rhetorical transition but an imagination of political discourse that helps accommodate the distinct Muslim identity within the nationalist framework, foiling the binary of loyalty and religious difference that has long questioned the distinct Indian Muslim narrative.
Yet, this development remains marked with uncertainty. While Owaisi’s assertive nationalism and rhetoric against Pakistan won unprecedented support across the communities, it simultaneously invited a series of criticisms from his own community. This tension reflects a broader dilemma within Muslim political consciousness, which continues to suffer from the baggage of mistrust toward the governmental machinery. The trajectory of Muslim political engagement in India depends on how the community navigates this delicate balance. It requires moving beyond the reactionary politics to a proactive vision of genuine citizenship and nationalism. Such a politics would not only bridge the gap of division but also articulate a constructive agenda that situates Muslim voices within the wider national discourse.
Reference
Husain, S. A. (1965). Hindustani Musalman: Aaina-e-Ayyam Mein (A. R. Bedar, Contributor; 1st ed.). New Delhi: Maktaba Jamia Limited.
Hasan, M. (1988). In search of integration and identity: Indian Muslims since independence. Economic and Political Weekly, 23(45/47), 2467–2471, 2473–2475, 2477–2478. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4394016
Jaffrelot, C. (Ed.). (2009). Hindu nationalism: A reader. Princeton University Press.
Das, Y. S. (2025, April 28). How Asaduddin Owaisi is foiling Pakistan’s most diabolical gameplan. India Today. https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/aimim-chief-asaduddin-owaisi-foiling-pakistans-most-diabolical-gameplan-hindu-muslim-pahalgam-terrorist-attack-2716220-2025-04-28
Bose, S. K. (2025, May 18). How Asaduddin Owaisi went from political loner to India mascot in 3 weeks. NDTV. https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/asaduddin-owaisi-pahalgam-attack-operation-sindoor-a-owaisi-was-set-to-miss-all-party-meet-he-became-india-mascot-in-3-weeks-8444824
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Zahid Kamal is a Research Scholar in the Department of Political Science at Maulana Azad National Urdu University, Hyderabad. His research focuses on caste among Muslims, social stratification, representation, and misrecognition. His academic interests also include political sociology, secularism, nationalism, Islamic theology, and minority rights in India.
